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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION
CLAUSES: LESSONS FROM THE NEW
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS*
After Smith, it is malpractice for an attorney to file a claim under the Religion
Clauses of the federal Constitution without also pleading the state
constitution. At the moment plaintiffs have a far better chance of success
with the state constitutions than with the federal. Some state courts will do
no better than the federal courts, but some will do much better.
Douglas Laycock'

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The Editors of the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public
Policy have made a wise decision to focus on state constitutional religion
provisions. The various religion provisions in state constitutions have been,
since the earliest state constitutions up until the present, central features not
only of the rights guarantees contained in such constitutions, but also of the
provisions limiting state and local government.2
The New Judicial Federalism (NJF) refers to the phenomenon beginning
in earnest in the 1970s where state courts, interpreting their state
constitutions, recognized rights greater than the rights protected by the
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution. A study of state
constitutional religion provisions provides a perfect lens through which to
* Robert F. Williams is a Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers University School of Law,
Camden; Associate Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies. This is an expanded version
of his presentation at a symposium, "Fifty States Under God," at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law in Minneapolis, April 19, 2013.
1.

Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 841, 854 (1992).
2.
See generally EDD DOERR & ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1993); CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, PHILLIP M. CARROLL & THOMAS C. BURKE,
RELIGION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
3. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 114-34 (2009).
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assess the larger lessons that we have learned to date from the NJF. As I have
observed, "Supreme Court federal constitutional interpretations represent the
middle of an evolving process of constitutional decisionmaking in our federal
system."' In 1986, United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. noted, "rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections
afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions... is probably the most
important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times."5
If the Supreme Court upholds the federal challenge (striking down the
state policy), the decision establishes a minimum national standard applicable
in every state.6 But if the Court rejects the asserted federal challenge
(upholding the state policy), the decision now triggers a series of "second
looks" at the question by state-level decision makers, including the courts,
based on state legal and policy arguments.
The United States Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment
Division v. Smith,' referred to by Douglas Laycock in the above quote, is an
excellent example of this paradigm. References to that decision, and the state
constitutional reactions after it, constitute a major theme in this Symposium.'
Of course, until the First Amendment religion clauses to the United
States Constitution were incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the 1940s, there really was no judicialfederalism
because the First Amendment did not apply to the states." It was only after
the Supreme Court's incorporation decisions that we achieved the "double
source" of both federal and state constitutional religion protections with
which we are now so familiar." It is in this modem constitutional milieu that
the "separationists" battle the "accommodationists."l2

4. Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 360 (1984).
5. National Law Journal, September 29, 1986, Special Section, at S-1. Accord William J.
Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Remarks of William J. Brennan, Jr., 13 VT. L. REV. 11, 11 (1988) (NJF is
"the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence today").
6. Such pronouncements about federal constitutional rights actually often leave much leeway
for state courts to interpret and apply vague or multi-factor tests in such a way as to be below the
federal standard, with little chance of correction by the Supreme Court. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald
F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 227
(2008).
7. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 115, 136.
8.
Employment Div. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. See infra notes 15, 31-33, and accompanying text.
10. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (Establishment Clause).
11. G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 78 (1989).
12. Id. at 75.
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THE DIFFERING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION CLAUSES
Virtually all of the state constitutions have more than one clause
concerning religion. These clauses represent both guarantees of individual
rights and limitations on state and local government. I have noted that there
are a variety of different types of state constitutional rights provisions, in
contrast with the more familiar federal constitutional rights. For example,
state constitutional rights provisions are substantially different from their
federal counterparts. Some of the best examples of these kinds of provisions
are the free speech guarantees that are often stated affirmatively and the
variety of religion clauses that are much more detailed than the First
Amendment."
In addition, by contrast to the First Amendment, which has remained
unchanged, state constitutional religion provisions have evolved over time.
As Dr. Alan Tarr has observed:
Many states' constitutional provisions dealing with religion
developed over time, largely in response to specific conflicts.
Characteristically they reflect their origins in these disputes,
displaying greater specificity and detail than do the analogous
provisions of the federal Constitution. In many instances, the state
provisions also reveal a different perspective on the relationship
between church and state than is found in the federal Bill of Rights.14
Paul Linton's article in this Symposium gives an exhaustive survey of
the states' constitutional provisions and their judicial interpretation. For my
part, I will take a fairly shallow dive into the state constitutional religion
provisions themselves, with a slightly deeper look at the NJF lessons they
illustrate.

13. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 116. See generallyJENNIFER FRIESEN, Chapter 4: Freedom of
Religion, in STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES (4 th ed. 2006).

14. TARR, supra note 11, at 76. Dr. Tarr further noted:
Thus the language found in state constitutions tends to be considerably more concrete and more
specific than that found in the federal document. Furthermore, because they have roots in particular
disputes, the state provisions have characteristically been phrased in language aimed at the specific
evils, which brought them forth. This accounts, for example, for the emphasis on "no aid" and on
freedom of worship in the states' early religion guarantees. Moreover, because of their origins in
concrete disputes, state provisions represent considered constitutional judgments about contentious
church-state issues and, as such, should lend themselves to direct application with only minimal
interpretation. Id. at 94.
15.

Paul

Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State

Constitutions, 7 UST. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103.
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LESSONS FROM THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
As mentioned earlier, state constitutional religion provisions provide an
excellent lens through which to view the lessons we have learned about the
NJF. The forgoing sections are intended, in summary fashion, to highlight
the key elements of what Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. referred to as "[t]he
most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.""
A.

State constitutional religion clauses predated the federal
constitution'sBill of Rights.

As early as the Declaration of Independence itself, the states began
writing constitutions that included religion guarantees. Of course, many of
the original states actually had established churches." Further, as pointed out
by Dr. Christopher Hammons in this Symposium, these early state
constitutions contained many references to God, and many of those
references remain today.' 8 Even states such as New Jersey, which did not
have a separate declaration or catalog of rights, included religious protection
(albeit only for Protestants) in the body of their early constitutions. 9 In fact,
many of these early state constitutional provisions on religion form the basis
for, or even remain the same in, the current state constitutions.20
B.

The state constitutionalreligionprovisions influenced the draftingofthe
FirstAmendment.

It is quite clear that the state constitutional declarations of rights drafted
during the "Founding Decade," prior to the adoption of the federal
constitution and the Bill of Rights, were a major influence on James
Madison's thought processes. Specifically, the religion provisions served as
important models in the drafting and consideration of the federal Bill of
Rights. According to Bernard Schwartz, "[i]f we look at the rights protected
by the Federal Bill of Rights, we find that virtually all were protected in the
state constitutions and bills of rights adopted during the Revolutionary
period. . . ."21
16. Brennan, supra note 5, at I1.
17. TARR, supra note 11, at 81.
18. Christopher Hammons, State Constitutions, Religious Protection,andFederalism,7 UST.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227. Interestingly, there are significant questions about the accuracy of the
collections of early state constitutions. See Horst Dippel, The Trap of Medium-Neutral Citation, or
Why A Historical-CriticalEdition ofState Constitutionsis Necessary, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 219 (2011).
19.

See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION 10 (2d ed.

2012).
20.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & LINNEA THODY, THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE

CONSTITUTION (2011).
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
21.
BILL OF RIGHTS 86-87, 198 (1977). See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
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C. One ofthe focal points ofthe admission ofnew states was the religion
clauses in their state constitutions.

During the process of admitting new states to the Union, before the
adoption of the new federal Constitution, Congress was concerned with,
among other things, the guarantee of religious liberty in the new states. For
example, this was an element of the Northwest Ordinance. According to Eric
Biber, "[t]he Ordinance was sweeping in its scope in shaping the new
territorial governments: the territorial government had to respect religious
liberty, protect habeas corpus and trial by jury, representative government,
bail, prevent cruel and unusual punishments, compensate private property
that was taken for public use, and provide public education."22
While not all states entered the Union under an Enabling Act, those that
did were invariably required to respect religious freedom. For example, the
1889 Enabling Act, which permitted the admission of the two Dakotas,
Montana and Washington, imposed the following requirements:
First. That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured
and that no inhabitant of said States shall ever be molested in person
or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship.
Fourth. That provision shall be made for the establishment and
maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be open to all
the children of said States, and free from sectarian control.23
These provisions have influenced modern interpretations of state
constitutional religion clauses, such as those in the state of Washington. 24 Eric

SOURCES AND ORIGINS I (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (texts of the First Congress drafts of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses). See also Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of
Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L. J. 251, 253-54 (1992):

An examination of the state bills of rights written between 1776 and 1787
shows that Madison effectively extracted the least common denominator from
them as the basis for his proposed list of amendments, excepting those rights

which might reduce the power of the national government. Almost every one
of the twenty-six rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights could be found in two or
three state documents, and most of them in five or more. Id. at 258.
22. Eric Biber, The Price ofAdmission: Causes, Effects, and Patternsof ConditionsImposed
on States Enteringthe Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 134 (2004) (emphasis added).

23. Enabling Act of 1889, Ch. 180, 50th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 1889).
24. See, e.g., Maylon v. Pierce Co., 935 P. 2d 1272, 1279 (Wash. 1997). For analysis of the
Enabling Act for Washington, see Frank J. Conklin & James M. Vache, The Establishment Clause
and the FreeExercise Clause of the Washington Constitution- A Proposalto the Supreme Court, 8
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411, 441-42 (1985). See also David A. Carrilo & Shane G. Smith,
CaliforniaConstitutionalLaw: The Religion Clauses, 45 U.S.F.L. REv. 689 (2011) (examining the
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Biber further identified a pattern in the conditions imposed by Congress on
the admission of new states:
The common theme revealed by the legislative history and the
broader history of the states and territories in question - is a fear by
Congress that the people of the territory about to be admitted could
not be trusted with self-government because they were not
"American" enough. Conditions were part of a larger process used
by Congress to shape a territory's society and government so that it
would be loyal, democratic, and more homogenous with respect to
the rest of American society.25
D. State constitutional religion clauses read quite differently from the
FirstAmendment.

The texts of state constitutional religion provisions, as noted earlier, are
substantially different from the more familiar First Amendment. For
example, one of Washington's state constitutional religion clauses reflects
Tarr's observation about such provisions' attention to specific matters over
time:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,
belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no
one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account
of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment: provided, however, that this article shall not be so
construed as to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for
such of the state custodial, correctional, and mental institutions, or
by a county's or public hospital district's hospital, health care
facility, or hospice, as in the discretion of the legislature may seem
justified. No religious qualification shall be required for any public
office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness orjuror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion,
California religion clauses with regard to their history and interaction with federal law). See
generally Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of
the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HAST. CONST. L. 1. 451 (1988)

(analyzing the intent of the drafters of Washington State Constitution in light of the modern debate
over the role of legislative intent in constitutional law).
25.

Biber, supra note 22, at 132.
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nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious belief
to affect the weight of his testimony.2 6
Once again, Linton's article in this Symposium provides excellent
coverage of the types of state constitutional religion provisions.27
E. Many state constitutionalreligion clauses are affirmative in nature
rather than negative
State constitutional religion clauses recognize and protect the affirmative
individual rights of citizens, while the First Amendment places negative
limits on the power of government. This is a very important distinction in the
area of free speech under state constitutions.28 One of the most important
consequences of the distinction between affirmative and negative rights
protection is that affirmative rights carry the possibility of applying to nonstate actors, while negative rights do not.29 This may become a very important
matter under state constitutional religion guarantees. 30
F. State constitutionalreligion clauses may be interpretedto be more
protective than the United States Supreme Court's interpretationsof
the FirstAmendment.
This lesson, of course, represents the central tenet of the NJF. Although
this phenomenon was certainly occurring to some extent prior to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Smith," such examples of independent
state constitutional interpretation accelerated after that decision. In this
respect, Chief Justice Christine Durham of the Utah Supreme Court observed
that "[s]oon after Smith, however, scholars began to turn to state
constitutions, with their expansive textual protections of religious liberty, as
potentially viable alternatives to Smith's restrictive federal doctrine."32 She

26.
27.

WASH. CONST. art. 1,§ 11.
Linton, supra note 15; TARR, supra note 11, at 94-95. See also Linda S. Wendtland,

Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State

Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REv. 625, 631-34, 638 (1985) (noting that the state religion
clauses are more specific and detailed and can be described in five categories that produce different
degrees of state activism).
28. See, e.g., New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994); Jennifer H. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts' and the New
Jersey Supreme Court's Treatments of Free Speech on PrivateProperty: Where Won't We Have
the Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589, 595 (2002) (noting that the states determine

whether their constitutions are interpreted more broadly than the Federal Constitution and that the
New Jersey Constitution, for example, contains both negative and affirmative rights).
29. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 188-90.
30.

Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, Freedom ofSpeech at a Private Religious University, 2 U.

ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 104 (2008).
31. 494 U.S. at 872.
32.

Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State
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further noted that "opposition to Smith in the legal community was
'thunderous."' 33
In the 2000 decision Humphrey v. Lane,34 the Ohio State Supreme Court
provided a good example of an independent state judicial interpretation of its
religion clause. This was a case involving an incarcerated Native American
who challenged the state's limitation on his long hair.3 ' The relevant Ohio
constitutional provision, Article I, Section 7, is also a long, detailed,
affirmative guarantee of religious freedom. In rejecting the United States
Supreme Court's test in Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the
state did have a compelling interest in the subject matter, but that it had not
chosen the least restrictive alternative to protect that interest. 36 Still again,
Linton's article in this Symposium reviews the states' decisions on whether
to diverge from the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the First
Amendment and to provide greater protection for rights (or limitations on
state and local government) under their own state constitutions.
G. State constitutionalreligion clauses are often interpretedin lockstep
with interpretationsof the FirstAmendment.

Despite the textual and historical differences in state constitutional
religion clauses and the First Amendment, many state courts interpret their
constitutional provisions in "lockstep" with federal constitutional religion
doctrines.3 ' These approaches can take at least two forms. The first is a caseby-case, reflective approach where the state court is fully aware that it may
Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 365-66 (2004). See also Nicholas P. Miller
& Nathan Sheers, Religious Free Exercise Under State Constitutions, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 303
(1991) (examining the impact of Smith on the states' free exercise clauses and the subsequent level
of scrutiny given to religious freedom cases among the states); Angela C. Carmella, State
Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993
BYU L. REV. 275 (1993); Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion
Under State Constitutions:A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
747 (1993) (noting that in the aftermath of Smith states have begun to consistently provide greater
state protection for religious liberty); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief
Conduct andJudicialBenchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059 (2000) (exploring the development of the
distinctions between state religion clauses and the First Amendment).
33. Durham, supra note 32 at 365 (quoting Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of
Religion Comes ofAge in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 236 (1998)).
34. 728 N.E. 2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
35. Id. at 1041-42.
36. Id. at 1047. See Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First
Decade, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 426-27 (2004) (discussing the decision in Humphrey v. Lane).
See also State v. Miller, 549 N.W. 2d 235 (Wis. 1996) (holding that it is unconstitutional to require
members of Old Order Amish to display red and orange triangular slow-moving vehicle emblems
on horse-drawn buggies because it was not the least restrictive means to satisfy the State's interest
in traffic safety).
37. Linton, supra note 15. See also Durham, supra note 32.
38. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 193-232.
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interpret its religion clauses to be more protective than First Amendment
doctrines, but after careful analysis of the state constitutional arguments,
concludes that it should "follow" the United States Supreme Court's
decisions on the same or similar issues. Interestingly, after the Supreme
Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner,39 a number of state courts interpreted
their state religion guarantees in lockstep.4 0 Another Ohio case presents a
good illustration.4 ' Here the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a school voucher
statute in reliance on the federal Lemon test, noting that the federal and state
provisions were "the approximate equivalent," but did not commit to follow
federal doctrine in the future. 42
Other state courts, however, follow a second approach through engaging
in the much less legitimate practice of "prospective lockstepping." Here, the
court announces that the federal and state clauses will be interpreted the same
way in the immediate case and in future cases. I have argued that such
statements are dicta and cannot be considered binding precedent for
methodology in future cases. 43 This tendency towards lockstepping fails to
understand the significant textual and historical differences between federal
and state constitutional religion clauses. This is somewhat understandable,
though, given the dominance of federal constitutional law in our country.
Further, "path dependence" and resource limitations in state courts can result
in old habits hanging on."
H. State constitutionalreligion clauses, may be less protective than the
United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the First
Amendment.
Although this possibility is not always acknowledged, state
constitutional religion clauses can be less protective than the First
Amendment either textually or as they are interpreted by state supreme
courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, has observed that the
New Jersey state constitution's protection of freedom of religion is "less
pervasive, literally, than the Federal provision."45 The Supreme Court of
39. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment requires the showing of a compelling government interest before denying an
individual unemployment compensation after the individual's job was terminated because it
conflicted with his or her religion).
40. Durham, supra note 32, at 370 n.122. For an interesting judicial discussion about whether
to lockstep the state constitutional religion guarantee with the First Amendment, see Gingerich v.
Comm., 382 S.W.3d 835 (Ky. 2012).
41. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E. 2d 203 (Ohio 1999); WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 200.
42.
43.

Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E. 2d at 211-12; WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 200.
See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1005 n.45 (Alaska 2008). WILLIAMS, supra note 3,

at 225-29.
44.

Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraintson IndependentState

Constitutionalism,115 PENN. ST. L. REv. 783 (2011).
45. Resnick v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 389 A.2d 944, 952 (N.J. 1978). See also TARR,
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North Carolina noted, in a different context:
Strictly speaking, however, a state may still construe a provision of
its constitution as providing less rights than are guaranteed by a
parallel federal provision. Nevertheless, because the United States
Constitution is binding on the states, the rights it guarantees must be
applied to every citizen by the courts of North Carolina, so no citizen
will be "accorded lesser rights" no matter how we construe the state
Constitution.46

This is not only an academic point, however. For example, if, after the
1963 rights-protective decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Sherbert,4 7 a state constitutional text or judicial interpretation had been "less
protective" than the Supreme Court's formulation, that approach might have
been resurrected by the later decision cutting back on protection of religion
in Smith.4 8
I.

State constitutionalreligion clauses, or theirjudicialinterpretation,
can violate the federal Constitution.

An important current debate is taking place concerning the "Blaine
Amendments" contained in many state constitutions.4 9 Serious questions
have been raised about state Blaine Amendments based on arguments that
they reflected anti-Catholic bias when they were adopted."o Professor Mary
Jane Morrison's article in this Symposium provides an up-to-date treatment
of the Blaine amendment controversy.5 '
In a case that might have raised the Blaine amendment issue, Washington
education officials interpreted Article I, Section 11 (quoted above)52 to

supra note I1, at 79; WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 63.

46.

State v. Jackson, 503 S.E. 2d 101, 103 (N.C. 1998). Some state constitutions contain

provisions requiring officeholders to acknowledge the existence of a "Supreme Being" or other
religious test. Such provisions have been held to violate the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. See, e.g., Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E. 2d I (S.C. 1997).
47. 374 U.S. 398.
48. 494 U.S. at 872.
49. See Conklin & Vach6, supra note 24, at 431-33, 436-42, 459-60; Joseph P. Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The FirstAmendment, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 657, 659, 670-74 (1998); Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered,36
AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 38 (1992); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and
Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice
and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117 (2000).
50. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.).
51.
Mary Jane Morrison, Dictionaries, Newspapers, and "Blaine Amendments" in State
Constitutions in the 21st Century, 7 UST. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205.
52. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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prohibit the use of state-financed scholarships for university religious studies.
This was upheld against a First Amendment Free Exercise challenge in Locke
v. Davey.53 The Court noted that the challenged provision of the Washington
state constitution was not a "Blaine Amendment."54
J. A too-expansive interpretationof a state constitutionalright to free
exercise of religion might possibly violate the FirstAmendment's
ban on state establishment of religion.
As perceptively pointed out by Professor Kent Greenawalt:
There is yet a further complexity I have thus far avoided. In
some instances, what the state might regard as appropriate
free exercise protection, might actually constitute a violation
of the federal establishment clause. Or what the state might
regard as a forbidden establishment of religion might be
guaranteed protection as free exercise or free speech."
K. Judicial interpretationsof state constitutionalreligion clauses may
be "overturned" by state constitutionalamendments.
Dr. John Dinan has referred to amendments to state constitutions that
overturn judicial interpretations of their provisions as "court constraining"
amendments." Dinan provided an early example, a provision in the New
Jersey Constitution of 1947, which authorized the legislature to provide
transportation for children in both public and parochial schools, even though
the courts had prohibited such involvement. He continued to explain that:
Several decades later, Wisconsin adopted a pair of court-overturning
amendments as well as a court-preempting amendment. A 1967
Wisconsin amendment overturned a 1962 state court ruling
prohibiting the use of public funds for transportation of children to
religious schools. A 1972 amendment then overturned a 1950 state
court ruling prohibiting the use by religious groups of public school
53. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). See also supra note 46.
54. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7 (noting that the Alaska Supreme Court also struck down state
aid to religious colleges in Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979)).
55.

Kent Greenawalt, The Concept of Religion in State Constitutions,8 CAMPBELL L. REV.

437, 446-47 (1986). See also TARR, supra note 11, at 80. But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City
of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion
are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.").
56. John Dinan, Foreword: Court-ConstrainingAmendments and the State Constitutional
Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 1003 (2007) ("These court-constraining amendments regarding

religious establishment mostly took the form of court-overturning amendments, though a few were
preemptive in nature.").
57.

Id.
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buildings during non-school hours. Another 1972 amendment sought
to insulate from state constitutional challenge legislative efforts to
provide for released time programs (where public school students
were released for religious instruction during school hours)."
Tarr identified another example of this phenomenon in Massachusetts in
1913, where the judiciary upheld aid to sectarian colleges and universities,
and was "promptly overturned by a constitutional amendment outlawing such
aid."5 9
L.

State courts are often directly involved in the procedures for
amending state constitutionalreligion clauses.

Tarr has pointed out that, in contrast to federal constitutional law, states'
judiciaries are often drawn into litigation over the processes of amending the
state constitution.60 A recent example has been unfolding in the state of
Florida, where a proposal to delete the Blaine Amendment from the
constitution has been enmeshed in litigation. Florida's Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, created in the state constitution itself, meets
periodically to propose changes in the state's tax laws and budgetary
processes. It proposed amendments not only to repeal the Blaine
Amendment, but also to modify the public education clause to permit school
vouchers for religious schools.' The Florida Supreme Court struck these
proposals from the ballot before a vote.62
CONCLUSION

These brief thoughts are intended to introduce the richness of analysis of
state constitutional religion clauses in the larger context of the renewed focus
on state constitutions in the New Judicial Federalism. These provisions, both
enumerating individual rights, as well as establishing limits on state and local
governments, must be considered on their own terms, independent of what is
more widely understood about the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
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